Syrian Crisis Shows an Increasingly Irrelevant UN
http://www.sptimes.ru/story/37965
On Monday, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged that
the U.S.
had submitted evidence that the army of Syrian President Bashar Assad had used
chemical weapons but said the classified documents were "absolutely
unconvincing." I would add that Russia
will never be convinced because the Kremlin has already stated its position: It
was the rebels who used chemical weapons near Damascus and suggesing otherwise is
"utter nonsense."
Indeed, could Washington have produced anything "more
convincing" than the results of laboratory analyses of chemical
substances, the testimonies of doctors and victims affected by the substances,
video material and intercepted conversations between Syrian generals saying
they had overdone it with the chemicals and that they should bomb sites to
eliminate the traces of deadly chemicals? Of course not. It would be physically
impossible to provide any other evidence in such a situation.
Consequently, this boils down to a question of trust:
"If I want to believe it, I will. If I don't want to, I won't." In
September 2001, the Kremlin was much quicker to believe the United States'
even scantier evidence of intercepted conversations indicating that al-Qaida
was behind the attacks on the twin towers and Pentagon. And yet the Kremlin
displayed far greater trust in Washington
then, and far more importantly, greater interest in working with the U.S. to combat terrorism and end Taliban rule in
Afghanistan.
Obviously, statements about "believing" or "not believing"
are only a cover for underlying political interests.
This episode confirms that, from now on, Moscow will work to ensure the survival of
Assad's regime and has cast aside such earlier statements as, "We are not
for Assad or for the opposition, but for the Syrian people." The Kremlin
apparently fears that a U.S.
missile attack will eventually succeed in toppling the Assad regime and Russia's policy
of support along with it. Meanwhile, Obama has backed both himself and the U.S. into a corner by having threatened action
if Syria
were to cross a "red line." But both Washington
and Moscow are
hostages to the UN Charter that obligates the Security Council to take strong
measures if weapons of mass destruction are used. Obama is attempting to take
measures, but half-heartedly, trying to cover his rear from criticism by both
the "peace-loving public" and congressional Republicans who accuse
him of "diminishing America's
leadership in the world." Obama is clearly taking a time-out in the hope
that the situation will resolve itself or evaporate like the sarin gas Assad
allegedly used against Syrian civilians.
It is doubtful that this short pause will save Obama. He
will probably have to carry through with his plans, and do so outside of the
framework of the UN Security Council. He will most likely have to base his
actions on the UN General Assembly's Responsibility to Protect doctrine, which
in 2005 established that world powers can protect the civilian population of a
country where internal conflict threatens the massive loss of life at the hands
of rulers.
Washington
is afraid of becoming embroiled in the Syrian civil war, and Moscow is afraid of losing everything. Thus,
all statements about "believing" or "not believing" are
about as relevant here as a pack of tarot cards.
Many people argue that Washington's serious gaffe in claiming that
former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein held weapons of mass destruction has
seriously undermined its credibility in presenting "evidence" against
Assad today. Note that back in 2003, the evidence against Iraq that U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
presented to the U.N. Security Council was more an effort to mobilize U.S. public
opinion than a justification for invasion. And it was not the desire for Iraqi
oil that motivated Washington,
although that oil became important later, when contracts were distributed
between the giants of many nations, including Russian LUKoil, rather than
seized by the Americans alone.
Recall that Saddam
Hussein himself was trying to convince his enemies that he had considerable
reserves of various weapons of mass destruction and that he was also developing
his nuclear program. Even many Iraqi generals were convinced of the truth of
such statements. But Hussein's regime was toppled because of his gross
violation of practically every major Security Council resolution calling on Iraq to halt
its nuclear program. What's more, each of those resolutions authorized the use
of military force if Baghdad
refused to cooperate with UN inspectors.
Then-U.S. Senator Barack Obama spoke out against the weak
evidence underlying the U.S.
invasion of Iraq,
but today the situation is radically different. That very same pacifist Barack
Obama sits at the helm in Washington and
weapons of mass destruction have undoubtedly been used in Syria. In fact,
this is not the first use of such weapons there, but only the first of such
scale. The U.S. and Europe are absolutely certain that Assad's army is
responsible for the attack. The UN Charter requires concrete action, but, as
happened in 2003, the Security Council is paralyzed and doomed to inaction.
That lack of resolve not only tacitly endorses the crime, but encourages its
repetition in the future. As happened with regard to Iraq, it is once again necessary to
bypass the increasingly irrelevant Security Council and form a "coalition
of the willing" among countries that are prepared to act. Apparently, that
approach is, of necessity, becoming the norm in international affairs today. To
put it simply, farewell, Security Council.
Alexander Shumilin is the director of the Center for the
Analysis of Middle East Conflicts with the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences.