Yasushi Akashi
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yasushi_Akashi
photos
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THE HAGUE
| 24.04.2013.
AKASHI
TESTIFIES AS DIPLOMAT
http://www.sense-agency.com/icty/akashi-testifies-as-diplomat.29.html?news_id=14895&cat_id=1
After 18 years Yasushi Akashi and Radovan Karadzic met
again, this time in the Tribunal’s courtroom. Karadzic was in the dock, Akashi was in the witness
stand. The former UN Secretary General’s special envoy was cautious and
diplomatic in his answers to the former Republika Srpska president
Yasushi Akashi, the UN Secretary General’s special envoy in
the former Yugoslavia,
was very cautious and diplomatic in his answers to Radovan Karadzic’s
questions. At the beginning of the examination-in-chief, Karadzic asked Akashi ‘which warring
faction had a vested interest in prolonging the war in BH’; the answer clearly
showed that Karadzic would find it hard to get the answers he wanted.
‘I think that the situation in the former Yugoslavia was
very complicated…’, Akashi said at the beginning of his answer and went on to
explain why there were many different reasons for the long war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The reasons were rooted in internal and international situation,
politics, economy, society, history and many others segments, Akashi said. ‘The opinions on the issue
differ’, Akashi
concluded diplomatically.
As Akashi
explained, at the beginning of the conflict Serbs held over 70 per cent of the
BH territory. This was why the ‘Serb side wanted a long-term cease fire while
the Bosnian government was against’ freezing the status quo, Akashi explained.
In 1994 and 1995, Karadzic and Akashi met about 20 times. As the Japanese
diplomat explained, the meetings were valuable to him because he could learn
about the Serb side’s positions. That is why he was grateful to Karadzic
‘although I didn’t quite agree with’ all of Karadzic’s views.
In his testimony, Akashi
recalled a meeting with Karadzic in Geneva
when they discussed the crisis in Gorazde. As Akashi said, he was upset because Karadzic
was telling him one thing, and later on he saw that something completely
differed had happened in the field. When Akashi
was asked if he as the ‘civilian chief of the military forces could always
achieve everything’, he answered ‘I could at least be sure that UNPROFOR would
obey the orders from their superiors’.
Karadzic tried to convince Akashi in court once again that the Gorazde
crisis was brought about by the attacks of the enemy troops on the Serb
positions. Karadzic said that his forces ‘had to’ responded. ‘They attacked, we
defended ourselves, then they started crying’, Karadzic told Akashi. The witness nevertheless replied that
he was not convinced it happened that way. This generalization ‘does not apply
to all situations’, Akashi
argued.
When Karadzic asked Akashi
about the Markale incident in February 1994, he referred to the conclusion of
an expert team Akashi
himself had founded: that the shell could have been fired either from the Serb
side or the BH Army positions. Karadzic reminded Akashi
that he and Stanislav Galic had been trying to convince Akashi that the BH Army had fired the round.
‘But I didn’t expect you to proffer a different opinion’, Akashi replied.
Karadzic also wanted to know if generals MacKenzie and
Briquemont ever told Akashi that the Bosnian
side in Sarajevo
opened fire from positions near public and vulnerable facilities, such as
hospital and schools, to provoke the Serb side into responding. Akashi heard Briquemont and some other high-ranking UN officials
in Sarajevo
mention it.
Tomorrow morning Karadzic will complete Yasushi Akashi’s
examination-in- and Akashi
will be cross-examined by the prosecution.
Yasushi Akashi: Masakr na Markalama mogla je izazvati i
granata Armije BiH
http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/yasushi-akashi-masakr-na-markalama-mogla-je-izazvati-i-granata-armije-bih/130424075
Pred Vijećem Haškog tribunala danas je započelo saslušanje
bivšeg specijalnog izaslanika generalnog sekretara Ujedinjenih naroda (UN) u
bivšoj Jugoslaviji, japanskog diplomate Yasushija Akashija, izvještava novinar
agencije Anadolija (AA).
Akashi,
kojeg u Bosni i Hercegovini smatraju kontroverznim zbog bliskih veza sa srpskim
vodstvom, pojavio se u Hagu kao svjedok odbrane na suđenju bivšem predsjedniku
Republike Srpske (RS) Radovanu Karadžiću, optuženom za genocid i druge zločine
tokom agresije u BiH od 1992. do 1995. godine.
Karadžić je na
početku iznio opasku kako će govoriti na engleskom jeziku, ''koji je pravi
pobjednik svih ratova 20. vijeka''.
''Bili ste
impresionirani mojom veličinom. Da sam krupan čovjek...'', prisjetio se, uz smijeh,
Karadžić detalja sa više od 20 susreta sa Akashijem, a što je japanski
diplomata opisao i u svojoj knjizi.
Akashi je tvrdio da je cilj misije UN-a u
bivšoj Jugoslaviji bio da se očuva mir, a ne da se on stvori. Pojasnio je kako
su zvaničnici UN-a imali ozbiljne sumnje u pogledu odlaska u bivšu Jugoslaviju,
ali da su evropske zemlje vršile pritisak na UN da se uključe, uprkos
postojanju spomenutih sumnji.
''Nije bilo mira koji
bi se očuvao'', ocijenio je Akashi.
Po
njegovim riječima, domaći faktori nisu bili pretjerano zainteresirani za
dugotrajni prekid vatre.
Na pitanje Karadžića
o ravnoteži vojnih snaga unutar BiH, Akashi
je istakao da se ona stalno pomjerala.
''U početku su snage
bosanskih Srba imale nadmoć, u jednoj fazi kontrolirale su 70 posto teritorije
BiH. Ali, pri kraju sukoba, negdje poslije 1994. godine, a svakako tokom 1995.
godine, ravnoteža se mijenjala u prilog strane bosanskih i hrvatskih vojnih
snaga. Strana bosanskih Srba je željela dugotrajnije prekide vatre, dok je strana
bosanske vlade bila protiv bilo kakvog dugoročnog zamrzavanja vojne situacije.
Došlo do izmjene ravnoteže i promjene u statusu naoružanih strana'', rekao je Akashi, prenio je novinar
agencije Anadolija.
Nadalje, Karadžić je Akashija podsjetio na navode iz njegove
knjige gdje je iznio tvrdnje da se kao posljedica aktivne vojne pomoći Amerike,
Njemačke i islamskih država bosanskim i hrvatskim snagama, ukupna ravnoteža
vojnih snaga pomjerila u korist BiH i Hrvatske, a protiv srpske strane. Akashi je potvrdio te
navode.
Akashi je govorio i o masakru na sarajevskoj
pijaci Markale.
''Sjećam se da je
bilo mnogo nagađanja u medijima o počiniocima te strašne tragedije na pijaci
Marakle u Sarajevu. U samom UNPROFOR-u su se pojavljivala razna nagađanja.
Odlučio sam da oformim jednu ekspertnu komisiju koja se sastojala od pet
balističara. Dva člana komisije bila su iz zemalja koje su bile prijateljski
raspoložene prema BiH i dva iz zemalja koje su bile prijateljski raspoložene
prema strani bosanskih Srba, a predsjedavajući iz neutralne Kanade. Mislio sam
da je sastav komisije takav da bi trebao biti prihvatljiv objema stranama.
Proučili su sve aspekte minobacačkog incidenta na pijaci. Samo jedna
minobacačka granata, kako je ustanovljeno, došla je na pijacu. Utvrđeno je kako
je pogodila neki predmet prije nego je pala na zemlju. Stručnjacima je bilo
teško da procjene odakle je pala ta granata'', tvrdio je Akashi.
Na osnovu ugla i
udaljenosti, pojasnio je, stručnjaci su mogli da procjene odakle je neki
projektil ispaljen. Po mišljenju stručnjaka
koje je on okupio, granata je na Markale ''mogla doći sa strane Srba ili snaga
bosanske vlade'', prenosi novinar AA.
''Zaključak koji sam
potpuno prihvatio bio je da je napad mogao doći s obje strane'', rekao je Akashi, dodajući da je o
tome obavijestio svoje pretpostavljene u UN-u. Na to je Karadžić rekao da mu je
i on osobno, dan poslije masakra, potvrdio da Srbi nisu odgovorni za napad, no Akashi je uzvratio da
drugačiji stav nije ni očekivao.
Karadžić je podsjetio
Akashija kako je tokom njihovih susreta bilo ''humora i dobre atmosfere'', te
da nikada sa Pala nije otišao ''praznih ruku''. Akashi se nije potpuno složio sa tim, tvrdeći
da nije ''uvijek bio u stanju da ostvari ono što je želio''. No, priznao je da
je nailazio na ''saradnju i razumjevanje''.
Isto tako, Akashi se požalio da mu
nikada nije dozvoljeno da obiđe Banju Luku, što je bilo uzrok njegove
frustracije. S druge strane, Karadžić je podsjetio kako ga je informirao da
vlasti takozvane Srpske Republike štite manjine od ekstremista.
Dok se Karadžić želio
predstaviti kao mirotvorac, Akashi je na insistiranje bivšeg vođe bosanskih
Srba želio ostaviti utisak kako vlasti Republike BiH, na čelu sa prvim
predsjednikom rahmetli Alijom Izetbegovićem, nisu željeli prekid vatre i
dugotrajniji mir.
Karadžić se ponovo
pozivao na Akashijevu knjigu u kojoj je on naveo da su vlasti RBiH u početku
htjele multinacionalnu državu, ali da je ''sada vrlo jasno da žele da formiraju
muslimansku državu''. Akashi
nije demantirao ove svoje ranije navode.
Karadžić je podsjećao
i na Akashijeve depeše kako nisu mogli ostvariti potpunu demilitarizaciju u
Srebrenici, što stvara probleme sa Srbima. Spominjano je i kako su snage Armije
BiH granatirale položaje Srba kod Srebrenice, prenio je novinar Anadolije.
Akashi je potvrdio da mu je Karadžić dao
pristanak za angažman snaga UN-a u Srebrneici i Žepi. S druge strane, govorio
je kako su Izetbegović i bivši ministar vanjskih poslova, odnosno bh. premijer
Haris Silajdžić pokazali manje entuzijazma od srpske strane za pregovore u
Ženevi.
Kako je Radovan Karadžić obmanuo Yasushija Akashija
http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/kako-je-radovan-karadzic-obmanuo-yasushija-akashija/130424093
Specijalni izaslanik generalnog sekretara Ujedinjenih naroda
(UN) u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, japanski diplomata Yasushi Akashi potvrdio je danas
na suđenju bivšem lideru bosanskih Srba Radovanu Karadžiću, optuženom za
genocid u Bosni i Hercegovini, kako je čuo opaske pojedinih generala
međunarodnih snaga stacioniranih u toj zemlji da bosanska strana, navodno,
zloupotrebljava javna i osjetljiva mjesta, bolnice i škole, izvještava novinar
agencije Anadolija
Sa tih mjesta su, navodno, vršena dejstva na srpske položaje,
a kako bi se isprovocirale odmazde.
Akashi se sjetio Karadžićeve spremnosti da
sprovede odredbe sporazuma, a kako bi se ''vodio normalan život u Sarajevu''.
Potvrdio je i kako je Karadžić naredio istragu o napadu na konvoj UNHCR-a kod
Teslića u BiH.
“Sjećam se krize u
Goraždu. Nemam dobre uspomene oko incidenata oko Goražda. Sjećam se da ste mi u
Ženevi rekli šta radi vaša strana. Nakon što sam provjerio, to jeste UNPROFOR
je na terenu to provjerio, ti navodi nisu odgovarali stvarnoj situaciji. To me
uznemirilo, te razlike između onoga što ste mi rekli i onoga što se dešavalo”,
rekao je Akashi Karadžiću, prenio je novinar Anadolije.
Akashi
se nije složio sa Karadžićevim tvrdnjama kako su bosanski muslimani izvodili
napade, Srbi se branili, a ''muslimani onda plakali''.
''Ne slažem se sa
vašom tvrdnjom koja se ne može primijeniti na sve konkretne situacije'', rekao
je Akashi.
Karadžić je tvrdio kako se isti obrazac desio u Goraždu,
odnosno da su Bošnjaci izazvali ''ove sukobe''.
''Vi ste vidjeli isti obrazac napada u ostalim zonama'',
rekao je Karadžić Akashiju, prenio je novinar Anadolije.
Nadalje, Karadžić je rekao da su ''muslimani bili razočarani
jer su oni željeli intervenciju NATO”. Akashi
je potvrdio to.
Na Karadžićev upit Akashi je potvrdio kako
su ga nekoliko puta uznemirila kršenja primirja u sigurnosnim zonama UN-a, a za
što su, navodno, bile odgovorne snage Armije RBiH.
''Kriza u Goraždu je
bila primjer rješavanja krize kroz ozbiljne pregovore, ali pod prijetnjom
zračnihudara NATO-a. Ali i prije zračnih udara koristili smo razgovore kako bi
postigli mir'', rekao je Akashi,
dodajući da je postojala spremnost da se zračni napadi izvedu na one koji budu
ugrožavali sigurnosne zone UN-a u BiH.
Saslušanje Akashija
nastavit će se i u popodnevnim satima.
Akashi
optužio Armiju BiH da je ubijala srpske civile na Igmanu
http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/akashi-optuzio-armiju-bih-da-je-ubijala-srpske-civile-na-igmanu/130424127
Specijalni izaslanik generalnog sekretara Ujedinjenih naroda
(UN) u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, kontroverzni japanski diplomata Yasushi Akashi kazao
je danas tokom nastavka svjedočenja u postupku protiv bivšeg predsjednika
Republike Srpske (RS) Radovana Karadžića, optuženog za genocid u BiH, da Vlada
Republike BiH nije pokazivala entuzijazam u vezi sa nastavkom sprovođenja
sporazuma o prekidu neprijateljstava iz aprila 1995. godine, izvještava novinar
agencije Anadolija.
“Mijenjala se vojna ravnoteža moći. To je išlo u prilog
bosanske vlade i pokazivali su manje entuzijazma za nastavak sporazuma'', rekao
je Akashi.
Na upit Karadžića on
je potvrdio kako je Armija BiH, navodno, koristila zaštićene zone UN-a za odmor
svojih snaga, obuku, konsolidiranje redova... Akashi je istakao kako je on visoke
zvaničnike UN-a upoznao kakvo je stanje stvari u šest zaštićenih zona UN-a u
BiH.
Akashi
je tokom današnjeg svjedočenja govorio i u mirotvornoj ulozi 39. predsjednika
Sjedinjenih Američkih Država (SAD) Jimmya Cartera koji je tokom 1994. godine
boravio u posjeti Palama gdje se susreo sa Karadžićem. Tada je, tvrdi, nastao
Carterov mir u BiH iza kojeg je stajao UN.
Akashi
je opisao kako je predsjednika Cartera pozvao telefonom dok je on bio kod kuće
u Atlanti i informirao ga o tome da se četveromjesečno primirje poštuje. Carter
je navodno rekao da mu je to uljepšalo Božić.
“Bosanska strana je bila protiv produženja sporazuma o
primirju koji je trajao oko četiri mjeseca. Bosanska vlada nije bila zadovoljna
posjetom Cartera, to ih je iritiralo”, rekao je Akashi, prenio je novinar Anadolije.
Na upit Karadžića Akashi je potvrdio da je
Armija BiH, navodno, ubijala srpske civile kod Igmana.
Saslušanje Akashija
nastavlja se sutra kada će on govoriti o Srebrenici.
Saturday 30 April 1994
Profile: Bureaucrat at large in the Balkans: Yasushi Akashi,
almost painfully diplomatic UN envoy
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/profile-bureaucrat-at-large-in-the-balkans-yasushi-akashi-almost-painfully-diplomatic-un-envoy-1373287.html
IT IS a sad irony for Bosnia
that the qualities which bring a man like Yasushi Akashi to the top in the
United Nations are the same qualities that, from the war victims' standpoint,
crown the UN efforts in Bosnia
with failure. The 63-year-old Japanese diplomat, who was appointed head of the
UN peace-keeping mission in former Yugoslavia last December, is by
nature a cautious man.
Mr Akashi first went to the United Nations in 1974, as part
of the Japanese mission. In 1979 he joined the UN staff and spent the next 15
years climbing through the UN bureaucracy. His progress was noted principally
for the absence of waves in the surrounding waters as he moved between jobs and
departments. He merged well with a bureaucratic culture in which keeping grit
out of the turning cog-wheels becomes an objective in itself, more important in
the long term than any putative direction that the great machine might be
taking. Akashi
was a good man with an oilcan.
Take this assessment, by a former colleague, as emblematic
of bureaucratic esteem: 'We all have to be very circumspect in what we do and
to take advice from our superiors. Mr Akashi has had a long career at the UN
and if he hadn't measured up he would have been asked to leave.'
When Akashi
was under-secretary general in charge of the information department, he ran it,
his colleague said, 'competently' - high praise in the grit-prevention lexicon.
'You have to operate within the system,' his colleague expanded, 'and being
daring or not just does not apply. He was also,' he added, warming to his
theme, 'extremely knowledgeable on the administration and budgetary committee.'
Not everyone remembers Mr Akashi so fondly. Ask some of his
former workmates about him and you hear a sharp intake of breath followed by a
decisive, 'I have nothing to say about Mr Akashi.' This is not just
bureaucratic caution. This is dislike. But why? There are several possible answers.
One of them is undoubtedly cultural - Western impatience
with a man whose culture finds the word 'no' unacceptably abrupt and whose
affirmative answers have to be held up to the light like a suspect banknote, to
be scrutinised for a genuine thread of acquiescence or exposed as a disguised
negative. That is part of the reality of an international bureaucracy. But add
to it a deep-dyed aversion to the use of force and what some interpret as a
diffidence that covers for indecision, and you get a sense of the emotions that
rise in Unprofor's military commanders when they have to talk to Mr Akashi.
He was in charge of the UN's department of disarmament in
1992 when he was suddenly picked to head the high- profile peace-keeping
mission in Cambodia.
Some who take an unenthusiastic view of Mr Akashi's abilities believe that he
was chosen over other able candidates largely because Japan was
committing large sums of money to the Cambodian peace settlement.
When he arrived in Phnom
Penh in March 1992, other UN staff complained that he
was distant and indecisive. He travelled with a Japanese- speaking British
assistant, and when faced with a difficult issue, Mr Akashi, who speaks fluent
English and good French, would often lapse into Japanese, shutting out those
who did not speak the language. His biggest public relations gaffe came when
aid workers complained that an enormous brothel district had suddenly sprung up
on the outskirts of Phnom Penh.
It was less the existence of the brothels that caused surprise than the number
of UN vehicles seen parked outside them. Mr Akashi dismissed the scandal. 'Boys
will be boys,' he said. The UN eventually banned its staff from visiting the
red- light area in official vehicles, but the ban was never fully enforced.
The most serious criticism of Mr Akashi's performance in Cambodia, however, has come back to haunt him in
Bosnia:
his dislike of confrontation. His desire to avoid conflict - a matter for
congratulation in New York - was seen as a
sign of weakness both by the Khmer Rouge guerrillas and the Phnom Penh government.
Early in his mandate in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge began to
back away from the peace agreement, and when he attempted to visit the
guerrillas' headquarters, he was turned back by one soldier at a makeshift roadblock.
Several UN officials believed that there was no risk of violence, and that Mr
Akashi should have walked on and forced a meeting with the Khmer Rouge, who
were thought to be testing his resolve.
At the same time the non-communist parties complained that
the Vietnamese-installed government of Prime Minister Hun Sen was abusing its
power, killing and threatening opposition party campaigners, while enriching
itself from the coffers of the UN. But Mr Akashi resisted confronting the
guilty parties, several of whom had been identified by name by his own police
force, and political violence continued to escalate.
In the end the elections went ahead and a government was
formed in Cambodia.
If the Khmer Rouge was not exactly marginalised, it was at least kept at a
distance that proved sufficient to prevent it destroying the electoral process.
The biggest UN operation to that date was judged a triumph. But while the UN
team in Cambodia collected much deserved credit, the success of the Cambodian
peace plan was greatly aided by the symbolic unifying influence of Prince
Sihanouk, who was later crowned king; by the fact that a peace agreement had
already been signed before the UN arrived and was reinforced by diplomatic
pressure from all the major powers; and by widespread disillusionment among the
ordinary people with two decades of war. Last week, the Khmer Rouge was again
fighting in western Cambodia.
With the Cambodian success under his belt, Mr Akashi was a
prime candidate for the job of bringing peace to ex- Yugoslavia. It is another sign of
the peculiarities of the UN culture that his appointment to the job was read
variously as a reward for success in Cambodia
or a poisoned chalice filled by jealous colleagues in New York. There is a third point of view,
held by Bosnian diplomats in the UN: that the appointment of such a cautious
man was explicitly designed to be a brake on action by those at the UN who
disapprove of the use of force in Bosnia. He himself seems ambivalent
about his role. 'Confucius,' he observed, 'said that a mediocre man given too
much free time tends to indulge in evil acts, so I see this job as a punishment
imposed on me by some wise deity.'
He brought his Cambodia
staff with him, displacing many of the established staff in Zagreb, perhaps a measure of his view of the
task that faced him. But Zagreb is not Phnom Penh: there is no
peace, there is no agreement among the major powers, there is no unifying
figurehead. Above all, nobody has yet reconciled the demands of Nato force with
UN peace-making. Mr Akashi's finger hovers above the Nato button, to the
evident frustration of the Nato force commanders.
Nato's irritation with Mr Akashi reached a public peak over
the seige of Gorazde, when the Serbs ignored Nato deadlines and, instead of
acceding to Nato demands for an airstrike, Mr Akashi chose to negotiate. His
stance has won him high praise both from the Serbs and from the UN
Secretary-General, not, in itself much of a recommendation in the wider world.
His position is scarcely enviable: he has more than 30
mandates and insufficient resources to carry them out. Had he agreed to the
bombing of Serb positions in Gorazde, many diplomats insist, true catastrophe
would have followed. But for the swaggering Bosnian Serb leaders, Mr Akashi's
aversion to potentially hostile enounters has opened a rich propaganda vein.
When he came in for criticism last week for his reluctance to order airstrikes
in Gorazde, they said that he was being punished by Islamic countries for his
even-handedness.
Diplomats who deal in realpolitik have what one called
'realistic' expectations of what Mr Akashi can achieve in Zagreb and argue that he is bound to be
criticised.
His criticism of the US
as being 'somewhat afraid, timid and tentative' after Somalia raised
ironic smiles among many observers. Nor has he been better understood in his
own country. Shortly after his appointment to head the UN peace mission in
former Yugoslavia, Mr Akashi
called for Japan
to send peace-keepers to the region.
'Japan,'
he said on Japanese television, 'having become a globally established country,
cannot say it is not concerned with European or African nations just because
they are not in Asia.'
Japan
declined; fighting might break out in Macedonia, it said, and it was too
dangerous to send Japanese personnel. Since then Mr Akashi has not called on
his government to contribute to the UN mission.
Mr Akashi cuts an incongruous figure in ex-Yugoslavia: a
small, dapper man, he is rarely seen to react, even when confronted with scenes
of horror. When he visited the scene of the massacre in a Sarajevo market, one of the most sickening
sights of the Balkan war, his diplomatic diffidence appeared unshaken. But a UN
official who works closely with Akashi
insists that beneath the contained exterior there is a man with a profound
faith in working through negotiation. The Akashi
this colleague describes was calm but firm in negotiation in Pale 10 days ago
with Radovan Karadzic and his men.
'Karadzic said that the Serbs were a proud people and would
not stand the humiliation of the air strikes. Akashi said that the Japanese were also a
proud people. Then he said that in 1941, the Japanese had been too proud and
too stubborn when they allowed themselves to be convinced that the whole world
was against them and let their persecution complex lead them to disaster. 'Mr
Karadzic,' he said, 'you know all about persecution complex.' In that one
exchange,' said the UN official, 'he managed to convey a sense of
understanding, a warning and offer a way out. It doesn't necessarily mean that
anything comes out of it, but the most you can hope for from a diplomat is that
he gets his point across.'